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§1. Introduction
Lewis’s	 two	Gods	knew	exactly	which	world	 they	were	 in,	but	 they	
didn’t	 know	 everything.1	 Neither	 God	 knew	 which God they were, 
truths	they	would	have	canonically	expressed	using	words	like	 ‘I’	or	
‘me’.	We’re	lucky;	we	aren’t	like	Lewis’s	Gods.	We	do	know	things	we	















tinct	 forms	of	 self-directed	 thought	with	minimal	effort	or	attention,	
an	ability	anchored	in	our	recognition	of	what	it	is	for	an	identity	be-
tween	their	referents	to	be	true.	
Recently	 there	 has	 been	 growing	 resistance	 to	 the	 essential	 in-
dexical	 thesis,	previously	considered	orthodoxy.2	This	paper	doesn’t	
join	 that	 resistance,	 but	 I	 do	 think	 that	 our	 preoccupation	with	 the	
essential	indexical	thesis	has	led	to	neglect	of	the	importance	of	our	
non-indexical	ways	of	thinking	of	ourselves	for	our	agency.	That	is	the	
focus	 of	 this	 paper.	Of	 course,	 thinking	 of	 oneself	 as	 identical	with	
the	 referent	 of	 a	 non-indexical	 concept	 is	 precisely	what	God	num-
ber	 three	can’t	do	—	so,	with	 this	 third	God	 in	view,	 the	question	of	
this	paper	becomes:	what	advantage	do	we	have	as	agents	over	God	
1.	Lewis (1979), p. 520
2.	See, e.g., Cappelen and Dever (2013), Magidor (2015) 
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rule	that	any	token	use	of	the	concept	refers	to	its	user.	This	rule	states	


















For	example:	I	have	full	mastery	of	the	concepts	Caesar, prime number 
and	is,	and	the	conceptual	capacity	for	concatenation,	but	Caesar is a 
prime number	 is	 plausibly	not	 a	 string	 that	 I	 can	meaningfully	 enter-
tain	—	at	least,	not	in	the	same	way	that	I	can	entertain	intra-categorial	






that	God	number	 three’s	attempts	 to	entertain	⌜I = δ⌝	 thoughts	are	
3.	 This framework excludes those who either don’t think the first-person concept refers 
(e.g. Anscombe 1975) or think it gets its reference in some way other than by the token-
reflexive rule (e.g. Evans 1982); I take these to be minority views among contemporary 







first-person	concept.	God	number	 three	 is	a	 thinker	defined	by	 two	
conditions:	
(i)	She	cannot	entertain	identities	of	the	form	⌜I = δ⌝;	and	
(ii)	 she	 is	 otherwise	 omniscient	 and	 conceptually	
unlimited.	
God	number	three	shouldn’t	be	conflated	with	another	possible	think-






of	 certain	 conceptual	 capacities	 of	 ours	—	that	 is,	 the	 conceptual	 ca-
pacity	 to	 recognise	 oneself,	 thought	 of	 first-personally,	 as	 identical	
to	 something	 thought	 of	 non-first-personally	—	the	 limitation	 in	 (i)	
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tive	 to	a	 iff	 the	 following	mistake	 is	not	possible:	g	pro-




There	 is	 yet	 more	 ongoing	 disagreement	 about	 which	 grounds	 get	
to	 count	 as	 issuing	 in	first-person	 judgments	with	 this	 property.	Al-
most	everyone	agrees	on	 introspection,	but	 the	rest	 is	controversial.	
Other	popular	 candidates	 in	 the	 literature	 include	proprioception	 (I 
have crossed legs)	and	the	distinctive	way	we	have	of	knowing	about	
our	own	actions	 in	virtue	of	being	their	agent	(I am peeling a potato).	
Gareth	Evans	adds	 to	 this	 list	our	 faculty	of	perceptual	 self-location	
(I am in front of a burning tree)	and,	along	with	others	after	him,	argued	
that	episodic	memory	serves	to	preserve	the	IEM	of	first-person	judg-
ments	into	their	past-tensed	analogues	(I was on a ship).	Others	have	
argued	 against	 the	 inclusion	of	 one	or	more	of	 these	 grounds.6	We	
5.	 This formulation is largely taken from Shoemaker (1969) pp. 556–7, with his talk of  ‘state-
ments’ updated to talk of  ‘judgments’ to make it applicable to the mental realm, and with 
the standard addition (since Evans 1982) of  relativisation to grounds. It approximates the 
which-object side of  Pryor (1999)’s which-object / de re divide, but since this is the stronger 
category of  the two, nothing hangs on putting things this way. By ‘grounds’ I mean to in-
clude both explicit inferences leading to the formation of  the judgment, but also implicit 
presuppositional background (see Wright 2012 and Coliva 2006 for two theorists who 
think presuppositional structure should be included in assessments of  IEM). Even where 
I drop the relativisation for ease of  expression, I always mean IEM (and VEM) relative to 
a use of  the first-person concept. As I have formulated it, IEM captures the impossibility of  a 
certain kind of  false positive error pertaining to a first-person thought that has already in 
fact been formed on certain grounds, rather than the impossibility of  having grounds that 
lead improperly to the formation (or non-formation) of  corresponding singular judg-
ments; thanks to a reviewer for pressing me on this point, and see Salje (2016) for more 
on this distinction.
6.	 For examples of  discussions of  the claimed IEM of  proprioception, see, e.g., Evans 
(1982), Cassam (1997), Hamilton (2009), Peacocke (2008), Coliva (2012), Morgan (2012), 
broadly	comparable	to	what	it	is	like	for	us	when	we	attempt	to	enter-







(i)	precludes	her	 from	properly	 forming	a	certain	range	of	I am F be-
liefs,	despite	her	omniscience	as	otherwise	given	in	(ii).	The	normative	
force	of	 ‘properly’	here	and	 throughout	 is	 that	of	epistemic	 justifica-
tion.	I	argue	for	this	first	step	in	§§2–3.	The	second	step	is	to	show	that	
this	restriction	to	her	properly	formed	I am F	beliefs	in	turn	restricts	
her	 agentive	 range	—	and	more	 specifically,	 that	 it	 limits	 her	 partici-
pation	in	the	domains	of	agency	associated	with	her	social	identity.	I	
argue	for	this	second	step	in	§4.	§5	concludes.	





this	claim	is	the	theoretical	notion	of	de jure absolute vulnerability to er-
ror through misidentification relative to a use of the first-person concept. The	
task	of	this	section	is	to	set	out	that	notion;	to	do	that,	we	will	need	




4.	 Note that there are parallel questions about how psychologically realistic Lewis’s two 
Gods are, if  we think that acting intentionally entails de se knowledge of  what one is do-
ing and if  we think that Lewis’s Gods are intentional actors (see O’Brien [1994] for the 
beginnings of  such an argument). This isn’t normally taken to undermine their usefulness 
in highlighting the significance of  our capacity for de se thought.
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formed,	but	in all circumstances.	Shoemaker	thought	that	mental-state	
self-ascriptions	were	 like	this.	The	judgment	 I am bored,	 for	 instance,	
is	 IEM	 in	 all	 circumstances	 of	 formation,	 or	 so	 the	 idea	 goes.	 The	
main	reason	this	category	has	since	been	largely	rejected	is	that	it	al-





file.	While	 this	epistemic	 transaction	 is	a	good	way	of	knowing	 that	
someone is	bored,	the	judgment	is	in	error	solely	because	I	have	taken	
myself	to	be	the	proper	witness	to	the	warranted	existential	claim.	So	




Individual	 cases	 like	 this,	 together	with	 natural	 extrapolatory	 as-
sumptions,	 do	 enough	 to	 undermine	 Shoemaker’s	 category	 of	 abso-
lute	IEM.	However,	I	also	think	that	there	is	a	more	principled	reason	
to	reject	that	category	in	the	offing.	The	case	just	given	typifies	those	
normally	designed	 to	demonstrate	 the	point	 in	 its	 involvement	of	a	
faulty	testifier,	and	this	 is	no	accident.	That’s	because	testimony	is	a	























way in which first-person judgments are formed	on	those	grounds.	If	there	
is	 no	 possibility	 of	 error	 through	misidentification	 relative	 to	 a	 use	
of	the	first-person	concept,	that	is	because	the	judgment’s	formation,	
including	 its	 presuppositional	 background,	 did	 not	 involve	 an	 iden-
tity	between	oneself	 thought	of	first-personally	and	oneself	 thought	
of	 non-first-personally.	 After	 all,	 the	 presence	 of	 such	 an	 identifica-
tion	would	have	brought	with	it	the	possibility	of	a	misidentification.	
But	if	that’s	right,	then	it	must	mean	that	these	epistemic	sources	are	
such	that	they	directly sustain first-person thought —	the	deliverances	of	
introspection	 (and	 the	 rest)	are	 the	 special	 forms	of	 self-knowledge	
through	which	I	directly	encounter	myself	as	myself,	without	drawing	
on	any	additional	identificatory	information.
The	 term	 ‘immunity	 to	 error	 through	 misidentification’ is	 from	
Sydney	 Shoemaker’s	 ‘Self-Reference	 and	 Self-Awareness’	 (1969).	
There	 Shoemaker	 offered	 a	 category	 of	 IEM	 judgments	 now	 gener-
ally	thought	to	be	defunct:	 the	category	of	absolute IEM	judgments.7 
These	are	judgments,	grouped	by	their	predicative	content,	that	aren’t	
IEM	relative	only	 to	a	given	 set	of	 circumstances	 in	which	 they	are	
Recanati (2012), Salje (2017); of  episodic memory, see Shoemaker (1969), Evans (1982), 
Coliva (2006), Pryor (1999), Bermúdez (2013), Fernández (2014), Shoemaker (1970); of  
agent’s awareness, see O’Brien (2007); of  self-location, see Evans (1982), Cassam (1997), 
Pryor (1999), Hamilton (2009), Peacocke (2014). 
7.	 p. 564
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between	 two	kinds	of	 absolutely	VEM	 judgments:	 those	 that	 fall	 in	
the	category	as	a	matter	of	 contingent	 fact	 (de facto	 absolutely	VEM 
judgments),	and	those	that	fall	in	it	as	a	matter	of	conceptual	necessity	
(de jure absolutely	VEM	judgments).	






inferring	 it	 from	a	 reliably	 correlated	non-visible	property	—	all	 epis-
temic	 grounds	 that	 introduce	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 error	 through	misiden-
tification	 into	 the	final	 judgment.	But	 this	 is	 just	 an	accident	of	our	
physiology.	We	might	have	been	set	up	with	eye	colour	on	the	inside	











ing	about	one’s	own	eye	colour	 that	 is	dedicated	 to	one’s	own	eyes	
and	no	one	else’s.8	Where	 there	 is	 single-object	dedication	 like	 this,	
there	is	IEM	relative	to	a	use	of	the	first-person	concept	—	these	would	




8.	 Martin (1995, 1997); see also Campbell (1999)
but	there	are	judgments	(categorised	by	predicative	content)	that	are	
always	VEM	relative	to	a	use	of	the	first-person	concept	in	all	circum-





that	 there	 aren’t	 very	 many	 candidate	 epistemic	 grounds	 that	 will	
make	it	 in;	 IEM	is	a	high	bar.	Now,	from	this	 it	 follows	that	there	is	
also	a	restriction	on	the	kinds	of	judgment	that	can	be	properly	formed	
on	the	basis	of	epistemic	grounds	falling	in	this	restricted	group.	That’s	






















two	 example	 judgments	 are	 absolutely	 VEM.	 The	 distinction	 is	










(ii)	 she	 is	 otherwise	 omniscient	 and	 conceptually	
unlimited.
Notice	now	that	the	identity	mentioned	in	(i)	is	just	the	sort	of	identity	
involved	 in	 the	 proper	 formation	 of	 self-ascriptive	VEM	 judgments.	











comes	when	 there	 are	 no	 IEM	 options.	 That’s	 to	 say,	 God	 number	
three	will	not	be	able	to	properly	form	any	absolutely	VEM	judgments.	
This	trouble	does	not	run	very	deep	for	self-ascriptive	judgments	









ter	of	 conceptual	necessity.	The	second	 judgment	above,	 I am prime 





through	 appropriately	 trained	 introspection,	 or	 self-location,	 or	 pro-
prioception.	To	properly	judge	that	I am prime minister,	rather,	it’s	plau-
sible	that	I	must	see	myself	“from	the	outside”	as	others	do,	as	occu-



















9.	 As with IEM, I will mostly drop (but always mean) the relativisation to a use of  the first-
person concept.




(I am a woman),	religion	(I am Buddhist),	religious-cultural	groupings	(I 
am Jewish),	disability	status	(I am able-bodied),	professional	role	(I am a 
plumber),	societal	role	(I am a prisoner),	caste	(I am a Brahmin),	national-
ity	(I am French),	race	(I am Hispanic)	and	subcultural	groupings	(I am 
a hipster).	
The	 epistemology	 of	 social	 kind	 judgments	 is	 clearly	 varied	 and	
rarely	obvious.10	 Those	partly	 associated	with	perceptible	biological	














This	 two-component	 model	 forms	 a	 natural	 epistemic	 counter-
part	to	views	of	social	ontology	falling	under	what	we	might	call	the	
10. Despite growing recent discussion of  social ontology (cf. Epstein [2018] for a recent sur-
vey of  the social ontology literature) and an ongoing separate debate about the semantics 
of  social kind terms (descended from Burge 1979), it’s arguable that the epistemology 
of  social kinds has been somewhat left behind. Amie Thomasson stands as an exception 
to the under-discussion of  the epistemology of  social kinds, in her interest in the ques-
tion whether there could be gross error or ignorance throughout a community about the 
constitutive rules on social kinds (see Thomasson 2003). Another notable exception is 
Haslanger, who addresses the question whether we could be ignorant of  the rules making 
up our operative (as opposed to our more formally or explicitly defined manifest) social kind 
concepts (Haslanger 2005, Haslanger and Saul 2006). However, both of  these questions 
differ from questions of  the form ‘How do I know that this token entity is a five-pound 






icative	 contents,	will	 be	 out	 of	 reach	 to	 a	 thinker	 like	God	number	
three,	even	if	there	are	some	ways	of	properly	forming	them	that	are.	
Real	 trouble	 for	God	number	 three	 comes	 in	 the	 form	of	de jure 
absolutely	VEM	judgments,	 judgments	 like	 I am prime minister.	 Judg-
ments	like	this	aren’t	just	typically	or	contingently	VEM	relative	to	a	
use	of	the	first-person	concept;	these	judgments	are	always	VEM	for	




the	form	⌜I = δ⌝	—	an	identity	of	just	the	kind	that	she	is	ex hypothesi 
barred	from	entertaining.	So	properly	formed	de jure	absolutely	VEM 
judgments	 are	 out	 of	 range	 for	God	 number	 three.	 These	 are	 judg-
ments	that	can	be	properly	reached	only	in	an	identity-involving	way	




our	non-indexical	ways	of	 thinking	of	ourselves.	That	 there	 is	 a	 cat-
egory	 of	 properly	 formed	 self-ascriptive	 judgments	 that	 is	 available	
to	us	only	by	virtue	of	our	capacity	to	think	of	ourselves,	thought	of	
as	 ourselves,	 as	 identical	 to	 the	 referents	 of	 non-first-personal	 con-
cepts	already	largely	answers	that	aim.	It	turns	out	that	this	capacity	
is	what	funds	our	ability	to	properly	form	this	range	of	I am F	beliefs:	
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this	entity’s	non-social	properties:	its	colouring,	texture,	size,	surface-












This	means	 that	 the	properties	 featuring	 in	our	 communally	 agreed	
rules	on	social	kinds	must	be	in-principle	publicly	accessible	proper-









at	the	judgment	this is a five-pound note.
There	are	two	premises	in	this	argument	in	need	of	support:	first,	
the	claim	that	the	properties	featuring	in	the	constitutive	rules	for	so-
cial	 kinds	must	 be	 in-principle	 publicly	 accessible;	 and	 second,	 the	
claim	that	 it	wouldn’t	suffice	for	knowledge	that	something	is	an	 in-
stance	of	a	social	kind	that	those	publicly	accessible	properties	are	ac-
cessed	 in	a	single-object	dedicated	way.	 I’ll	 take	each	 in	 turn	before	
13. It’s harder to know how I could have a single-object dedicated way of  knowing facts about 
its provenance — perhaps an exercise of  single-object dedicated abductive inference.
two-dimensional	model	of	social	kinds.11	Included	under	this	model	are	
any	views	on	which	 facts	about	 the	metaphysics	of	 social	kinds	are	
determined	by	a	 specification	of	certain	non-social	 facts	on	 the	one	
















this	 a	 Spaniard,	 this	 a	 woman?12	 According	 to	 the	 two-component	




knowledge	of	 this	 kind	 through	a	 single-object	dedicated	epistemic	
source.	
So,	 is	 it	 possible?	Well,	 yes	 and	 no.	What’s	 conceivable	 is	 that	 I	
could	have	a	single-object	dedicated	source	of	knowledge	of	many	of	
11. This use of  the term ‘two-dimensional model’ is from Brouwer (2018); at the intended 
level of  generality here, the model is intertranslatable between fact-talk and entity-talk. 
12. I frame the following discussion in terms friendly to Searle’s framework, as the currently 
dominant account in the literature, but analogues of  the argument to follow will apply to 
any two-dimensional account of  social ontology that appeals to communally established 
constitutive rules on social kinds, even where the agreement is less explicit than on Searle’s 
account (see Epstein 2013, p. 14, for a helpful survey of  options).


















I	 have	 a	way	of	 telling	 that	 the	 item	 instantiates	 the	 relevant	 range	
of	properties,	but	I	must	know	it	in	a	way	that	facilitates	recognition	























how	best	 to	do	 it.14	Minimally,	however,	 social	kinds	are	 theoretical	





phenomena.15	For	 instance,	 it	would	clearly	be	a	bad	 idea	 to	posit	a	
human-society	 currency	 whose	 constitutive	 condition	 included	 the	
property	 of	 being	 composed	 of	 1,638,278	 billion	 atoms.	 Individuals	






Next,	why	 couldn’t	 these	properties	also	 be	accessible	 through	a	





14. Cf. Epstein (2018), s.2
15. At least, in the majority of  cases. There could conceivably be derivative cases of  instances 
of  the kind whose relevant properties were not accessible to others, but only once the 
kind were established by paradigm instances in which the properties were publicly acces-
sible; hence the ‘in principle’ qualifier.





So,	 included	 in	 the	first-person	 judgments	 that	 systematically	 elude	
God	number	 three	are	 judgments	about	her	 social	 identity.	No	mat-
ter	what	counterfactual	interventions	we	try,	God	number	three	could	
never	properly	come	to	form	beliefs	about	her	own	gender,	race,	so-












§4. What God number three can’t do
The	stated	aim	of	 this	paper	was	 to	 identify	 the	advantage	we	have	
over	God	number	three	as agents.	The	debility	mentioned	at	the	end	
of	the	last	section	doesn’t	yet	give	us	an	answer	to	that	question,	be-
cause	 it	 tells	 us	 only	 what	 self-ascriptive	 beliefs	 she	 can’t	 properly	
form,	not	what	she	can’t	do	as	an	agent.	But	it	gets	us	most	of	the	way	



























cepts	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 properly	 ascribed	 in	 a	 single-object	 dedi-
cated	way.	It	is	part	of	the	nature	of	these	concepts	that	their	proper	
application	depends	on	an	awareness	of	 the	object’s	properties	 that	
feature	 in	 the	 relevant	 communal	 beliefs	 and	 attitudes.	 Insofar	 as	 I	








This	 brings	us	back	 to	 the	 central	 question	of	 this	 section:	what	
can’t	God	number	 three	properly	believe	—	God	number	 three,	who	
16. This proposal is neutral on what these properties are; I don’t rule out that they could 
include such self-determined properties as public avowals.







temically	 justified)	 beliefs	 better	 suited	 to	 sustaining	 reliable	 and	










tion	makes	 for	 stability	over	 time.	And	 it	 is	only	 stable	beliefs	over	
time	that	can	reliably	motivate	coherent	patterns	of	action	over	time.	
I	say	that	the	explanation	of	reliable	and	coherent	patterns	of	inten-








a	misascribed	 gender	 category	 as	 a	 child	will	 be	 reliably	motivated	
to	act	coherently	 in	ways	made	appropriate	by	 those	gender	beliefs,	
despite	 those	beliefs	being	 false.	The	key	notion	 for	 the	production	
of	reliable	and	coherent	patterns	of	intentional	action	over	time	is	not	
truth	but	well-groundedness.











this	 improperly	 formed	 belief	 will	 obviously	 feature	 in	 a	 personal-
level	 explanation	of	why	 I’m	 currently	hiding	under	 the	 table.	 Like-




acting	by	 their	 lights	—	forming	 the	spontaneous	belief	 that	 she	 is	a	
woman	and	intentionally	ticking	the	box,	for	instance.	Their	improper	
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as oneself	 is	 in	 some	 sense	 incompatible	with	 apprehending	oneself	
as an object —	indeed,	 for	Schopenhauer,	 this	 is	 “the	most	monstrous	
contradiction	ever	 thought	of”.17	 If	 the	essential	non-indexical	 thesis	
is	true,	then	not	only	is	it	possible	to	think	of	oneself	as	oneself	as	an	
object,	but	our	capacity	to	think	of	ourselves	this	way	is	indispensable	
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